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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 21 MARCH, 1968 NUMBER 2
Presumptions, Burden of Proof and
the Uniform Commercial Code
W. Harold Bigham*
The Uniform Commercial Code uses the terms "prima facie" and
"presumption" in different contexts and frequently without clearly
indicating whether the terms are intended to affect the risk of non-
persuasion or the burden of producing evidence. Professor Bigham
discusses the ambiguous use of these terms and calls for clarification
by amendment to the Code. He also suggests the probable intention
of the drafters with respect to particular sections.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code' represents an attempt to codify,
to clarify and to improve the substantive law of commercial transac-
tions.2 Even a summary examination of the Code impresses one with
the magnitude of this ambitious undertaking to reform so huge a
body of substantive law. Inevitably, such a project must shade over
into areas of adjective law and problems of proof. Whether through
inadvertence or failure of the draftsmen to solicit the aid of persons
whose expertise is outside the substantive law of commercial transac-
tions, it is precisely at the points where substantive and procedural
law meet in the Uniform Commercial Code that the most infelicitous
results may very well have occurred.
The confluence of substantive law and procedural law is most
turbulent in the area of presumptions and burden of proof.3 It is
almost axiomatic that the burden of proof problem represents a
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the UNiFonm COMMERCIAL CODE are
to the 1962 Official Text with Comments.
2. Perhaps the best source of material regarding the background of the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE is contained in Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. 1Ev. 798 (1958). See also Schnader, The New
Commercial Code: Modernizing Our Uniform Commercial Acts, 36 A.B.A.J. 179
(1950).
3. There has, of course, been a plethora of legal writing dealing with the presump-
tion and burden of proof problem. Some of the better works include: Gausewitz,
Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VND. L. REv. 324 (1952); McBaine, Burden
of Proof: Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 13 (1954); Morgan, Some Observations
Concerning Presumptions, 44 HAnv. L. 11Ev. 906 (1931); Roberts, An Introduction
to the Study of Presumptions, 4 VILL. L. tEv. 1 (1958).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
"lamentable ambiguity of phrase and confusion of terminology; 4
furthermore, it has been said of both presumption and burden of
proof that "presumption is the slipperiest of the family of legal terms,
except its first cousin, 'burden of proof'."5 It is the thesis of this
paper that in the area of commercial law the draftsmen of the Uni-
form Commercial Code have not only done very little to alleviate
the ambiguous and slippery nature of the burden of proof and pre-
sumption problems; but, unhappily, new ambiguities and uncertain-
ties have been injected as a result of a lack of proper attention to
these procedural spectres which haunt the law.
The author disavows, in limine, any contention that the draftsmen
of the Uniform Commercial Code were not cognizant of procedural
problems, or that they did not in several areas attempt to deal spe-
cifically with the grant or deprivation of procedural advantage in
pursuance of policy objectives. In like fashion, the author makes no
claim for himself of any particular inspiration, divine or otherwise,
concerning a new theory or technique for handling burden of proof
and presumption problems. The author's presumptuous sally into
this area is motivated by a feeling that the knowledge of substantive
law is essential to a meaningful discussion of presumptions and
burden of proof in the Code, and that, without doubt, the draftsmen
could have done better in this area.
Although it is certainly true that the thesis of this paper, to the
extent that it reflects a lack of satisfaction with the treatment of
presumptions and burden of proof in the Code, is not a universally
shared view,6 the results of a study by the California Law Revision
Commission7 necessitated by the almost concurrent enactment of
the California Evidence Code and the Uniform Commercial Code,
demonstrated rather forcefully the ambiguities, interstices and lack
of appreciation for the nature of the problem reflected in the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Indeed, California early found-as would
most states-that the treatment of presumptions and burden of proof
in the Code was not consonant with the pre-Code treatment of this
problem, and that it would be a mistake to have one set of rules
applying to commercial transactions and another to all other sub-
stantive law.8 Subsequently, after adoption of the California Evi-
4. 9 J. WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2485 (3d ed. 1940).
5. McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. 11Ev. 291,
295 (1927).
6. See, e.g., Note, The Law of Evidence in the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 CA.
L. RFV. 44 (1966).
7. See 6 CALnFORNL. LAW REVIsION COMMISSION, REPORTS, RFCOmMENDATIONS AND
STUmrs 1009 (1964); 8 CALwomaA LA-w REViSION COMMressIoN, REPORtTS, RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND STUDES 303-13 (1966). See also California State Bar Committee,
The Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CALIF. ST. B.J. 117 (1962).
8. "While California Law needs clarification and probably reform, the inconclusive
[ VOL. 21
PRESUMPTIONS
dence Code,9 which constituted essentially a reworking of the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, several very material amendments were
recommended for the Uniform Commercial Code for the purpose of
clarifying the presumption and burden of proof rules and conforming
the Commercial Code's treatment to that of the California Evidence
Code.'0
Only a few specific examples of the general problem introduced
above will suffice to describe its dimensions. In the first place, the
term "prima facie" is used in several instances in the Code, but not
always in the same sense." For example, it was the clear intent of
the draftsmen, by the utilization of "prima facie" in at least one
section (2-719(3)), to affect the burden of proof (risk of non-per-
suasion). A concomitant of the "prima facie" difficulty is the fact
that in several instances' 2 the Official Comments of the Code suggest
the creation of a rebuttable presumption where it is at least ques-
tionable that the statute itself creates one. Furthermore, to exacer-
bate the problem, the Comments quite frequently suggest that the
presumption created has a different procedural effect from that
which results from essentially similar language in another section
or Official Comment. In many instances where it is intended to
create rebuttable presumptions, it is impossible to tell whether the
presumption affects the risk of non-persuasion ("burden of proof")
or the burden of going forward with the evidence ("burden of pro-
Code provision would accomplish neither. Further, it would be unwise for one law
of presumptions to apply generally and another to apply in actions under the Code,
especially when Code and non-Code issues might often be intermingled in a single
lawsuit." California State Bar Committee, The Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CALri'.
ST. B.J. 117, 131-32 (1962).
9. CAL. Evm. CoDE ANN. (West 1967).
10. The amendments represent primarily a classification of presumptions according
to whether they affect the risk of non-persuasion or the burden of producing evidence.
For example, § 1-201(31) defines the term "presumption," but a new section, 1-209,
has been recommended by the California Law Revision Commission clarifying the
effect of presumptions: "except as otherwise provided in sections 1-202 and 4-103, the
presumptions established by this code are presumptions affecting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence." The other amendments are similiarly designed to make clear that
certain presumptions created by the Commercial Code either affect the burden of
proof in the sense of risk of non-persuasion or in the sense of the burden of pro-
ducing evidence. The text of the suggested amendments are contained in 8 CAIJrroaIA
LAW REvisION Comi ssioN, REPoRTs, RECOMmENDATIONS AND STUDIES 307-13 (1966).
11. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 infra.
12. See, e.g., UNmFormr Comn2macuL CODE § 2-313, Comment 6. "In most cases,
the intent of the drafters of the Commercial Code-i.e., how they would have classi-
fied the Commercial Code presumptions had they been aware of and been applying
the distinction in the Uniform Rules of Evidence between presumptions affecting the
burden of producing evidence and the presumptions affecting the burden of proof-
is relatively clear. In a few cases, the answer is more doubtful, and an educated guess
must be made in light of what appears to be the legislative purpose of the part of
the Commercial Code in which the particular section appears." 8 CAIwoRNaA LAW
RFvisro, CoMmmssION, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUms 308 n.1 (1966).
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ducing evidence"). 13 This is at least in part attributable to the
ambiguous and incomplete definition of the term "presumption" given
in section 1-201(31) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
II. PESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF-THE CONTEXT
OF THE PROBLEM
At least since the publication of Professor Thayer's treatise 4 in
1898 there has been almost continuous turmoil regarding the pur-
pose and function of presumptions and burdens of proof. It is per-
haps more accurate to state that the real dissension is about the
effect of a rebuttable presumption, for, after all, an irrebuttable pre-
sumption, or conclusive presumption, is a rule of substantive law,
presenting no particular problem.
At the risk of oversimplification, the positions on the issues in-
volved may be stated briefly as follows. 15 The first view is that a
presumption is a preliminary assumption of fact that disappears from
the case upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain the
finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. This is the view
espoused by Professors Thayer and Wigmore, 16 by the American
Law Institute's Model Code,17 and accepted by what is in all likeli-
hood a majority of courts. Professor Thayer expressed it thus:
Many facts and groups of facts often recur, and when a body of men with
a continuous tradition has carried on for some length of time, this process
of reasoning upon facts that often repeat themselves, they cut short the
process and lay down a rule. To such facts they affix, by a general declara-
13. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise indicated, "burden of proof" means
the risk of non-persuasion.
14. J. Tr yER, A PRELIMINARY TREArIsE ON EVIDENCE (1898). Also a landmark
in the dispute regarding the effect of presumptions in the burden of proof is Abbott,
Two Burdens of Proof, 6 HARy. L. REV. 125 (1892).
15. For a very lucid and succinct exposition of the problems, see C. McConMicK, Evi-
DENCE §§ 306-22 (1954).
16. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2490 (3d ed. 1940).
17. MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE rule 704(2) (1942). The introductory note to the
chapter on presumptions in the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE suggests that there have
been at least 8 views as to the procedural effect of presumptions. The American Law
Institute concludes that: "Presumptions must be classified, and each class must be
given an effect commensurate with the strength of the reasons which induced its
creation. This calls for an almost impossible performance. Each of the ...presump-
tions heretofore recognized by the courts would have to be carefully studied and
assigned its proper class; and provision would have to be made for an arbitrary
assignment of presumptions created hereafter and not judicially or legislatively classi-
fied when created. The cure would probably be as bad as, if not worse than, the
disease. A simple solution must be sought even though it may not be as rational as
a complicated one." Id. at 312. It is, of course, the contention of the author that the
presumptions contained in the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE are not so numerous
as to make the task of classification impossible. Already the California Law Revision
Commission has, it seems, shown the way.
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tion, the character and operation which common experience has assigned
to them.18
Arrayed on the other side are Professors Morgan 9 and McCor-
mick,20 as well as others less distinguished. It is their position that
a presumption should shift the burden of proof to the adverse party,
since presumptions are created for reasons of policy. They reason
that if the policy underlying a presumption is of sufficient weight
to require a finding of the presumed fact when there is no contrary
evidence, it should be of sufficient weight to require a finding when
the mind of the trier of fact is in equilibrium, and, a fortiori, it should
be of sufficient weight to require a finding if the trier of fact does
not believe the contrary evidence. Of course, the "burden of proof,"
of which the Morgan-McCormick disciples speak is the "risk of non-
persuasion," or as the Model Code of Evidence defines it, "the
burden which is discharged when the tribunal which is to determine
the existence or non-existence of a fact is persuaded by sufficient
evidence to find that the fact exists."2' It should be noted at this
point that the Uniform Rules of Evidence use the term "burden of
proof" rather than the burden of persuasion. 22 Both the Model Code
and the Uniform Rules23 use the term "burden of producing evi-
dence" to describe the obligation of one party to adduce sufficient
evidence to avoid a directed verdict in a jury case, i.e., what is tra-
ditionally thought of as a "prima facie" case.
Professor BohlenF suggested that there is a third view to the ques-
tion of the effect of rebuttable presumptions on the burden of proof.
His position is that both the Thayer view and the Morgan view are
correct in some instances, and that the vice of the positions is the
polarity and intractability of them. As Professor Morgan has very
aptly pointed out,25 and as Bohlen confirmed, the fact is that pre-
sumptions are created for a variety of reasons, and no single theory
or rationale of presumptions can deal adequately with all of them.
An acceptance of this view would result in the classification of
rebuttable presumptions as (1) affecting the burden of producing
evidence, or (2) presumptions affecting the burden of proof. The
18. THAYER, supra note 14, at 326.
19. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 33 (1957).
20. C. MCCORIncK, EVIDENCE §§ 306-11 (1954).
21. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 1(3) (1942).
22. UNIFonr RULES OF EVIDENCE 1(4).
23. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 1(2) (1942); UNnFom RULES OF EVIDENCE
1(5).
24. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of
Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1920).
25. See, e.g., E. MORGAN, J. MAGUIRE & J. WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 440 (4th ed. 1957).
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categorization would have to abide analysis of the policy reasons for
the creation of the presumption in the first instance.
Along the lines of the Bohlen suggestion, the Uniform Rules of
Evidence classify presumptions based on whether there is an under-
lying inference supporting the presumption.26 Under the Uniform
Rules, presumptions based on an underlying inference affect the
burden of proof-the risk of non-persuasion; presumptions not so
based affect the burden of producing evidence. The soundness of
this view has been not only questioned, but also rejected in Cali-
fornia.27 It is argued that the Uniform Rules of Evidence were mov-
ing in the right direction in attempting a classification of presump-
tions according to their effect, but that it is wrong to base the classi-
fication on whether there is an underlying inference supporting it.
The California Law Revision Commission has pointed out:
Thus, a presumption affecting the burden of proof is most needed when
the logical inference supporting the presumption is weak or nonexistent
but the public policy underlying the presumption is strong. Because the
URE fails to provide for presumptions affecting the burden of proof at
precisely the point where they are most needed, the Commission has dis-
approved URE Rules 14-16 and has substituted for them proposed statutes
classifying presumptions according to the nature of the policy considera-
tions upon which the presumptions appeared to be based.28
As Professor Morgan has pointed out, "[t]here are myriads of
situations in which the courts declare that the establishment of the
basic fact requires the assumption of the existence of the presumed
fact and unless and until certain conditions are fulfilled."29 Hence, it
may be that in view of the varying circumstances which call for the
existence or creation of a presumption, that the preceding sentence
represents about as good a definition as one can devise. However that
may be, it is true that commercial law represents a body of substantive
law where untold situations call for policy decisions concerning which
party to the commercial contract will bear the burden of producing
evidence of a fact. More often than not goods and/or instruments
move under circumstances which are beyond the control and knowl-
edge of either party to subsequent litigation. Again, in many in-
stances, the permissibility of the conduct of one party to a commer-
cial transaction may rest largely upon a subjective state of mind
with which he has made a decision or which motivated certain acts
on his part. Although the presumption itself is designed to alleviate
26. See UNIFoRm RULE OF EVIDENCE 14-16; cf. F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW
or TORTS 651 (1926).
27. 6 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIsioN CoMMIssION, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STUDIEs 1017 (1964).
28. Id. at 1017-18.
29. MORGAN, MAGurnE & WEiNsTEN, supra note 25, at 441.
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the exquisitely difficult problem of production of evidence in such
cases, a perfect scheme is entirely too much to hope for; neverthe-
less, the Code treatment of the problem could be improved.30
III. TrE CODE'S TREATMENT OF PRESUMPONS
AND BuBiN OF PROOF
A. Code Definitions
The Uniform Commercial Code definition of presumption in sec-
tion 1-201(31) is both incomplete and ambiguous. A comparison
with Rule 13 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and with Rule 704(1)
of the Model Code of Evidence will demonstrate the origin of the
Code definition:
A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law
which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of
facts found or otherwise established in the action.31
(1) . . . [Wihen the basic fact of a presumption has been established
in an action, the existence of the presumed fact must be assumed unle.5s
and until evidence has been introduced which would support a finding of its
non-existence. . . . (Emphasis added).3
(31) 'Presumption' or 'presumed' means that the trier of fact must find
the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced
which would support a finding of its non-existence. (Emphasis added).3
The Code definition is incomplete because it fails to give any instruc-
tion as to how it is to be dealt with once it is "rebutted," i.e., its effect.
Having served its purpose of evoking the requisite contrary evidence,
should the presumption be disregarded and not mentioned in the
instructions to the jury?34 The Thayer-Wigmore followers would an-
swer this question in the affirmative; but surely there are instances
where the underlying policy of the Uniform Commercial Code calls
for the use of presumptions to shift the "risk of non-persuasion,"
rather than merely to shift the burden of producing evidence. Just
as surely the draftsmen of the Code did not intend to create an area
of discretion in which those construing the Code are free to divine
30. See generally Kinyon, Actions on Commercial Paper: Holder's Procedural Ad-
vantages Under Article Three, 65 MicH. L. REv. 1441 (1967); Note, The Law of
Evidence in the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 GA. L. REV. 44 (1966).
31. UNIFOnm RULE OF EVIDENCE 13.
32. MODEL CODE OF EvDENcE rule 704 (1942).
33. UNIFORm ComnsRncI.LL CODE § 1-201(31).
34. On the question of whether the jury is to be told about presumptions, see
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Satcher, 152 Fla. 411, 12 So. 2d 108 (1943); Bryan v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939); Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wash.
2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953). See also Falknor, Notes on Pesumptions, 15 WAsH. L.




the legislative purpose of the section according to their own pre-
conceived notions of the law of evidence. Such is not likely to result
in view of the underlying policy in favor of uniform interpretation
of Code sections where in fact underlying policy may well be para-
mount.
Although "prima facie" is used in several places in the Code, it is
not defined in the definition section, 1-201, or elsewhere in the
statute. Section 1-202 provides that certain documents in due form
purporting to be those authorized or required by the contract to be
issued by a third party shall be "prima facie evidence" of their own
authenticity and genuineness and of the facts stated in the document
by the third party. Apparently, insofar as section 1-202 establishes
a presumption of the authenticity and genuineness of the document,
it was intended as a preliminary assumption sufficient to support a
finding in the absence of contrary evidence.
Such a decision as to the meaning of "prima facie" here is compli-
cated, however, by the Code definition of "presumption" and the
lack of guidance as to its effect. It is at least arguable that "pre-
sumption" would have been used in section 1-202 if the intent had
been to create a rebuttable presumption affecting only the burden
of producing evidence and that, therefore, the risk of non-persuasion
was intended to be affected. This theory is in turn supported by
language in the Comments suggesting that the "section is designed to
supply judicial recognition for documents which have traditionally
been relied upon as trustworthy by commercial men."
35
Equally unsatisfactory and confusing is the treatment accorded
"prima facie" in sections 4-103 and 4-201. Subdivision (3) of sec-
tion 4-103, relating to a bank's responsibility for its failure to exer-
cise ordinary care, provides in part:
. .in the absence of special instructions, action or non-action consistent
with clearing house rules and the like or with a general banking usage not
disapproved by this Article, prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary
care.
That a rebuttable presumption of some kind is intended seems ob-
vious. Whether the presumption is strong enough to affect the risk
of non-persuasion is much less clear. The Comments, however, sug-
gest, at least, that the intent of the drafters was to create a presump-
tion affecting the burden of proof:
The prima facie rule does, however, impose on the party contesting the
35. UNIFORM CoMMEncIAL CODE § 1-202, Comment 1. In addition, §§ 1-102(1)
& (2)(c) state: "(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies. (2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act
are ... (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
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standards to establish that they are unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair.36
Militating against the conclusion that section 4-103 creates a pre-
sumption shifting the risk of non-persuasion to one challenging the
fairness of clearinghouse rules or general banking usage, is the ap-
parently variant treatment of "prima facie" in section 1-202 con-
sidered above.
Discussion of another Code section which does not even mention
the term will further demonstrate how difficult is the task of untying
the Gordian knot which is the Code treatment of "prima facie."
Section 4-201 provides that, "unless a contrary intent clearly appears,"
a bank is an agent of the owner of any item, and any settlement
given is provisional. A rebuttable presumption affecting burden of
proof must be intended. The Comments confirm this unequivocally,
but it is repeatedly there referred to as a "prima facie rule of
agency."
37
Finally, lest one hasten to the conclusion from examining the above
mentioned sections that a rebuttable presumption affecting the risk
of non-persuasion was intended to be the result of using the expres-
sion "prima facie," section 3-115 should be considered. This section
is concerned with the filling in of incomplete negotiable instruments
in general and with the question of unauthorized completion in
particular. The draftsmen make it clear that, consistent with the
definition of "burden of establishing"38 in section 1-201(8), the pre-
36. UNIFORM COMMECIrAL CODE § 4-103, Comment 4. This should be contrasted
however with the preceding sentence which states: "However, the phrase 'in the
absence of special instructions' affords owners of items an opportunity to prescribe
other standards and where there may be no direct supervision or control of clearing-
houses or banking usages by official supervisory authorities, the confirmation of ordi-
nary care by compliance with these standards is prima facie only, thus conferring on
the courts the ultimate power to determine ordinary care in any case where it should
appear desirable to do so."
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIALr CODE § 4-201, Comment 2, states that "[w]ithin this
general rule of broad coverage, the first two sentences of subsection (1) state a rule
of status in terms of a strong presumption. 'Unless a contrary intent clearly appears'
the status of a collecting bank is that of an agent or sub-agent for the owner of the
item." The following paragraph of this Comment states that "a contrary intent can
rebut the presumption but this must be clear." Both Comments 3 and 4, however,
speak of the agency status as being a prima facie one. For a recent case discussing
this presumption, see Pazol v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Sandy Springs, 110 Ga. App.
319, 138 S.E.2d 442 (1964).
38. Apparently "burden of establishing" was deliberately used in order to avoid
the use of the term "burden of proof," since the latter might have a tendency to
confuse the question of who has the burden of first producing evidence of a fact with
the question of who has the burden of ultimate persuasion. The confusion exists re-
gardless of the term used, and the use of euphemisms or synonyms is hardly a panacea.
The extremes to which this kind of thinking can be extended are demonstrated by
the fact that in § 3-307(3), the term "shown" is used in lieu of "burden of proof" or
"burden of establishing." Thus one is forced to dig through layers of meaning to
divine the intention of the draftsmen, only to be disappointed, of course, by finding
1968 ]
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sumption of authorized completion affects the burden of proof (risk
of non-persuasion). The contrast made by the Comment to section
3-115 between what was intended in the Code and the N.I.L. treat-
ment of the same question is startling, to put it mildly:
The language on burden of establishing unauthorized completion is substi-
tuted for the "prima facie authority" of the original section 14. It follows
the generally accepted rule that the full burden of proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence is upon the party attacking the completed instru-
ment.39
B. Analysis According to Underlying Policy
Despite what has been said, in most cases the intent of the drafters
of the Commercial Code is not too difficult to discern, provided that
attention is given to the substantive policy obviously sought to be
subserved. Unhappily, the still prevalent unfamiliarity with the Code
on the part of the bench and bar, and the difficulties presented by
the Code treatment of presumptions and burdens of proof may pro-
duce an unenviable record of judicial interpretation with results
which are neither uniform nor in accord with legislative purpose.
Some organization of the subject of presumptions and burden of
proof in the Code must be suggested and some analysis must be
made concerning the proper effect of the Code's rebuttable presump-
tions. Such an analysis should consider the policy to be served by the
Code generally and by the particular provision, the degree of prob-
ability of the existence of the presumed fact, the accessibility of evi-
dence, and any other evidence which may reveal the reason for
the presumption. We begin first with those sections creating pre-
sumptions40 where the drafters clearly intended to affect the burden
of proof or where, although unclear, judicious construction of the
Code calls for treating the presumption as being one affecting the
risk of non-persuasion.
C. Presumptions Affecting Burden of Risk of Non-Persuasion
Acceleration clauses in security agreements, promissory notes and
even sales contracts are common devices used by a party obligee
as: (1) an in terrorem clause to motivate performance, (2) a method
to proceed against the obligor before his situation deteriorates further,
that what was meant was in fact "burden of proof," but still without a guide as to
whether the risk of non-persuasion or the mere burden of going forward with the
evidence is involved.
39. UNrnomr Col.nvaCmCi CODE § 3-115, Comment 6.
40. Unless otherwise indicated, all presumptions discussed hereinafter are rebuttable




and, (3) an excuse for his refusal of continued prejudicial change of
position (usually performance). The Uniform Commercial Code
recognizes that such clauses serve valid economic objectives, but also
that they are subject to abuse. It is the handling of the latter prob-
lem with which we are concerned. Section 1-208 provides:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accele-
rate payment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral
'at will' or 'when he deems himself insecure' or in words of similar import
shall be construed to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he
in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is
impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party
against whom the power has been exercised.
Obviously, it was intended to cast upon the obligor the burden
of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact (lack
of good faith) is more probable than its non-existence. It is un-
deniably true that the defendant obligor's burden is a very heavy
one. Subjective intent is elusive indeed, and the obligor has the
burden of establishing the negative because the obligee might not
otherwise be able to prove the affirmative, i.e., the existence of good
faith. Does it therefore follow that the obligee may simply, ipse dixit,
declare himself "insecure" and accelerate, with nothing more? If so,
the section almost creates an irrebuttable presumption.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently encountered this problem
in Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson,41 which involved an attempted
acceleration of the maturity date of a note secured by a security inter-
est in a mobile diner. The note permitted acceleration if the "holder
felt insecure." In discussing the proof of good faith, the court stated:
We construe the latter provision [definition of "burden of establishing" in
section 1-201(8)] as requiring the submission to the jury of the issue of
good faith unless the evidence relating to it is no more than a scintilla, or
lacks probative value having fitness to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable men. (Emphasis added).
Whether one finds the court's wording intellectually satisfying or
not, it is hard to find fault in its conclusion that the "basic fact" of
the presumption is not the mere act of attempted acceleration. It is
rather the act plus some amount of evidence regarding circumstances
supporting the alleged feeling of insecurity from which the trier of
fact could conclude that good faith was the motivating factor. Such
construction in no way emasculates the "whip hand" given the
obligee, and it does give some protection to the obligor who is all
but defenseless.
The Uniform Commercial Code distinguishes between an attempt
41. 385 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Ky. 1964).
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to disclaim42 a warranty in connection with a sales contract and an
effort to limit the remedies for breach which might otherwise accrue
as a result of the presence of the warranty. Section 2-719(3) pro-
vides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
We have already seen that the treatment of "prima facie" in the
Code is something less than satisfactory. There are severe problems
presented by 2-719(3) ,43 but whether it creates a presumption affect-
ing the burden of proof should not be one of them. The clear trend
in the extremely volatile area of products liability law is toward
manufacturer and distributor accountability for defective or danger-
ous goods placed on the market. Indeed, perhaps the Code, by al-
lowing limitation of consequential damages, is not so restrictive
toward the prospective defendant-manufacturer as is the developing
tort law-this seems particularly so if the consumer's "injury" is only
economic. However, the draftsmen have made the section consistent
with the policy of products liability law by apparently placing the
risk of non-persuasion on the defendant-manufacturer.
How shall (or should) the "prima facie" unconscionability created
in section 2-719(3) work in practice? Having cast upon him who
attempts to limit consequential damages in this context the burden
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that such limita-
tion is conscionable, what must he show to bear his burden? The
controversial unconscionability provision of the UCC is apposite
here, specifically section 2-302(2) :44
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
45
Under section 2-719(3) it seems that any argument which would
42. UNiFoRm CoM McIAL CODE § 2-316 sets forth the rules for disclaiming the
warranty itself.
43. For an excellent comparison of the provisions of § 2-316 dealing with disclaimer
of warranty and those of § 2-719 dealing with limitation of liability, see R. DUmEN-
BERG & L. KING, SALES AND BuLK TRANsFERs UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 7.03[2] (1966).
44. For a delightful and exhaustive treatment of the unconscionability provision of
the Code, see Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-the Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
45. It should be pointed out that the unconscionability provision of the UNiFOnM
COMIfRCnIAL CODE, § 2-302, requires the court to make the finding of unconsciona-
bility. Much of the criticism of the section reflects a fear that a runaway jury might
rely on hindsight to relieve a party from a contract which has become unprofitable
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bar recovery of consequential damages for personal injury from con-
sumer goods would fail unless the seller presents evidence of the
"commercial setting, purpose and effect." Consumer protection from
personal injury is a laudable, supportable end. The use of the novel
unconscionability concept of the Code, wedded to the rebuttable pre-
sumption affecting burden of proof, is a reasonable way to obtain it.
The seller is in a much better position to know and to be able to
prove the "commercial setting, purpose and effect."
D. Presumptions by Implication
There are at least three Commercial Code sections which clearly,
albeit inferentially, create rebuttable presumptions.46 Particularly in-
teresting is the fact that, in the case of all three, 2-202, 2-720 and
7-403, the presumption is of a character requiring the party against
whom it operates not merely to introduce sufficient evidence to
create an issue as to the non-existence of the presumed fact for the
trier of fact, but to establish its non-existence by a preponderance
of the evidence.
The parol evidence rule, which is, of course, a rule of substantive
law, forbids the admission of evidence to contradict or vary the terms
or to enlarge or diminish the obligation of a written instrument or
deed, except upon grounds of fraud, accident or mistake.47 Section
for him, even though at the time of its making the parties to it were on a parity with
respect to their knowledge of what might occur in the future. Even under pre-Code
law provisions excluding consequential damages have been enforced as law matters of
course. See, e.g., Graves Ice Cream Co. v. Rudolph W. Wurlitzer Co., 267 Ky. 1,
100 S.W.2d 819 (1937); Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst, 229 Minn. 436, 40 N.W.2d
73 (1949); Associated Spinners, Inc. v. Massachusetts Textile Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 263
(1947); Crandall Eng'r Co. v. Winslow Marine Ry. & Ship Bldg. Co., 188
Wash. 1, 61 P.2d 136 (1936). Courts have been loathe to find limitations of liability
or disclaimers of warranty absent clear contractual language to that effect. See Note,
Provisions in Contracts for Sale Affecting the Remedies of the Buyer for Breach of
Warranty, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 466 (1928).
46. Under the UNIFORM SAr_ s ACT, §§ 14 & 16, a sale by sample or description
created a warranty of merchantability, but this was an implied warranty. Section
2-313 of the UNIFoRm CommERcIAL CODE creates an express warranty where there is
a sale by sample or description. The section itself says nothing about any presump-
tion, but Comment 6, in discussing a sale where a sample is used, states that "in
general, the presumption is that any sample or model just as any affirmation of fact
is intended to become a basis of the bargain." On the surface this would appear to
be an irrebuttable presumption, and therefore a rule of law; but the remainder of
Comment 6 suggests that it is capable of being rebutted. If it is rebuttable, it would
almost certainly be a presumption affecting the risk of non-persuasion. Any other
interpretation of it would emasculate the treatment of the sale by sample or descrip-
tion as being one creating an express warranty. Compare UNIFORM COMMERcIAL
CODE § 9-306(4) which creates an apparently illogical irrebuttable presumption regard-
ing cash proceeds. In this connection see, G. GiLmoE, SECUrry INTEREsTs IN
PERSONAL PROPERaTY § 45.9 (1965).
47. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 210-22 (1954).
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2-202 of the Commercial Code "loosens up" the parol evidence rule
by abolishing the pre-Code presumption that a writing (apparently
complete) is a total integration, and by requiring the court to make
a finding that the parties intended a total integration, before "con-
sistent additional terms" (parol) are to be excluded. Section 2-202
states:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agree-
ment or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or
supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and ex-
clusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
The Comments clearly reveal the policy involved, not only in
abrogating the positive presumption of intended integration but
also in establishing the negative presumption. The basis for the pre-
sumption is of course the high degree of probability of non-integra-
tion thought by the draftsmen to exist. This premise is, at best, a
debatable one, but uniformity of interpretation and execution of
legislative purpose dictate that the presumption be treated as one
affecting the risk of non-persuasion. Noteworthy also is the fact that
he who contends for integration must satisfy the court, for ultimately
it is a question of law.
48
The Sales Article of the Code grants to both seller and buyer sev-
eral different remedies in the event of breach. There is no "election
of remedies" trap for the aggrieved party and the pursuing of one
remedy does not preclude resort to an alternative or cumulative rem-
edy in order to make the party whole. In the heat of the moment,
however, the innocent party may make statements evidencing his
intention to cancel, to rescind, to call it off and the like. Section
2-720 is designed to protect the wronged party by preserving all his
remedies, including the seeking of damages, despite indiscreet and
improvident statements he may make:
Unless the contrary intention clearly appears, expressions of "cancellation"
or "rescissior" of the contract or the like shall not be construed as a renunci-
ation or discharge of any claim in damages for an antecedent breach.
Implicit in the section is the recognition that an aggrieved contract-
ing party may deliberately choose to abandon all remedies save can-
48. RESTATEME (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1932) treats the parol evidence
rule as one of substantive law.
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cellation or revocation of acceptance. However, in all probability,
such a choice will rarely be made. For this reason, as well as for the
clear policy of preserving to the complaining party all his remedies,
the presumption should be treated as one affecting the burden of
proof.
49
Section 7-403 of the Commercial Code deals in general with the
obligation of an issuer-bailee who has issued a document of title to
redeliver the goods upon demand by a holder of the document of
title:
(1) The bailee must deliver the goods to a person entitled under the
document who complies with subsections (2) and (3), unless and to the
extent that the bailee establishes any of the following:
(a) delivery of the goods to a person whose receipt was rightful as
against the claimant;
(b) damage to or delay, loss or destruction of the goods for which
the bailee is not liable [but the burden of establishing negligence
in such cases is on the person entitled under the document];
(c) previous sale or other disposition of the goods in lawful enforce-
ment of a lien or on warehouseman's lawful termination of storage;
(d) the exercise by a seller of his right to stop delivery pursuant to
the provisions of the Article on Sales (Section 2-705);
(e) a diversion, reconsignment or other disposition pursuant to the
provisions of this Article (Section 7-303) or tariff regulating such
right;
(f) release, satisfaction or any other fact affording a personal defense
against the claimant;
(g) any other lawful excuse.
Strong factors of policy, including superior accessibility to the
evidence compel the conclusion that a presumption affecting burden
of proof was intended. Similar language-but less specific than here
-in section 8 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act was construed
as superseding the common law rule that a bailee merely had the
burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient to overcome the
legal presumption of negligence.50 "As to each of the seven defenses
listed in section 7-403(1)," says Professor Braucher, "the bailee would
seem to have the full burden of proof or risk of non-persuasion."5'
49. For a discussion of UNIwoRm ComImmcIA.L CODE § 2-720, see Anderson, Re-
pudiation of a Contract Under the Code, 14 DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (1964). The Comment
states: "This section is designed to safeguard a person holding a right of action from
any unintentional loss of rights by the ill-advised use of such terms as 'cancellation,'
'rescission,' or the like. Once a party's rights have accrued they are not to be lightly
impaired by concessions made in business decency and without intention to forego
them. Therefore, unless the cancellation of a contract expressly declares that it is
'without reservation of rights,' or the like, it cannot be considered to be a renunciation
under this section."
50. Denning Warehouse Co. v. Widener, 172 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1949).
51. R. BRucnm, DocuMENrs OF TrrLE UNDER UIauroRM COMrmCIAL CODE:
§ 3.41 (1958).
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If negotiable documents of title are to pass as "couriers without
luggage" in the channels of commerce, the transferees and holders
must be insulated, insofar as it is feasible to do so, from the claims
and equities of the bailee-issuer. This goes to the very heart of
negotiability, and Professor Braucher is clearly correct in his analysis
of the burden of proof to be borne by the bailee.
E. Presumptions Affecting Burden of Producing Evidence
There are nine sections of the Uniform Commercial Code which
expressly create rebuttable presumptions affecting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence.52 An examination of underlying policy, degree of
probability of the existence of the presumed fact and accessibility to
the evidence demonstrates that all of these considerations point toward
a presumption affecting burden of producing evidence. Moreover,
the definition of "presumption," incomplete and ambiguous though
it may be, at worst suggests the type of presumption under discussion
here. Concluding that it is quite possible that different courts would
reach different results concerning the proper classification (i.e., the
effect on burden of proof in both senses) of the Code presumptions,
it is not surprising that the California Law Revision Commission has
recommended that the presumptions created in these nine sections
be classified as presumptions affecting the burden of producing evi-
dence.5
3
It may be argued that this result is unfortunate in view of the fact
that most, if not all of the presumptions are premised on a high degree
of probability of the existence (or non-existence) of the presumed
fact. Even if this were in fact the basis for all the presumptions
created in the nine sections involved, as we have already seen, a
good case could be made for having the presumption affect only the
burden of producing evidence. The party claiming that the improb-
able has occurred is already facing a difficult problem in attempting
to create a triable issue for the finder of fact; to require him to es-
tablish the fact by a preponderance may be nearly impossible.
Three of the sections of the Code which create rebuttable presump-
tions-3-114, 3-304, and 3-503-involve the setting of arbitrary limits
measuring the minimum time for reasonableness in which certain
action may be taken. There are two bases underlying these pre-
sumptions: (1) it would be a waste of time and effort to permit un-
seemly wrangling over attempts to prove the essentially unproveable,
at least within the range of reasonableness; and (2) though arbitrary,
52. These are §§ 3-114(3), 3-304(3)(c), 3-307(1)(b), 3-414(2), 3-416(4),
3-419(2), 3-503(2), 3-510, & 8-105(2) (b).
53. See 8 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STuDIES 309, 311 (1966).
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it is preferable that the legislature establish time limits for the acts
concerned, subject to a contrary showing by the party against whom
the presumption works.
Other sections, exclusive of sections 3-307 and 8-105, involve
situations where the underlying inference is strong and where there
may be a lack of accessibility to evidence on the part of the one
enjoying the benefits of the presumption. Once countervailing proof
is introduced, it is appropriate that the presumption disappear.
Sections 3-307 and 8-105 warrant special consideration. These sec-
tions, worded almost identically, provide the presumption that a per-
son is a holder in due course of negotiable instruments and investment
securities. Section 3-307 reads:
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature on an
instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of a signature is put in
issue
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under the
signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized except
where the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported
signer who has died or become incompetent before proof is
required.
(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the
instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes
a defense.
(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights
of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some
person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course.
It is immediately obvious that the Code treatment is different from
that under the pre-Code law. Under N.I.L. section 59:
When it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the
instrument is defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he is
some person other than whom he claims acquired the title in due course. ...
It is to be noted "defective title" has been changed to "defense exists."
With regard to defenses of the maker arising after the negotiation
of the instrument to the holder, the Code effects a change. Under
the N.I.L., the presumption still acted in the holder's favor, and the
burden of proof did not shift. That this will not be the result under
the Uniform Commercial Code is confirmed by the recent decision
of United Securities Corp. v. Bruton,54 where the defense arose after
negotiation to the plaintiff.
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, "[e]very holder
54. 213 A.2d 892 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1965).
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is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course." 55 When a
maker under the N.I.L. pleaded that the plaintiff was not a holder
in due course, the burden was on the one in possession to prove that
he was a "holder," i.e., that he held title and the instrument was
negotiated to him. The burden was then on the maker to establish
defective title to prevent the holder from being a holder in due
course. The burden of proof to establish fraud was met when the
maker proved the fraud by a preponderance of the evidence. To
satisfy this burden, the maker had to establish that the holder had
not taken the instrument under such conditions, "that at the time it
was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instru-
ment or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."56 If the maker
failed in this respect, the holder was entitled to a judgment on the
note without further proof than that necessary to make out a prima
facie case. The majority of cases held that when the maker had es-
tablished a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden
shifted to the holder to show that he was the holder in due course
for value and without notice of an infirmity.
57
There are, of course, two types of defenses: those good against
the holder in due course, and those which are not. Under section
3-307(3) of the Code, when it is shown that a defense of the latter
type exists, the burden of establishing that he is the holder in due
course falls upon the holder. Although the Comments in section
3-307 make it fairly clear that the defendant must establish by the
preponderance of the evidence that a defense exists, the trend of
the decisions seems to require the introduction of a lesser amount
of evidence than a preponderance.5 Indeed, the cases relying on
UCC section 3-307(3) seem to hold that the maker need only intro-
duce a quantity of evidence sufficiently strong for the maintenance
of the action. It is small consolation to the holder that the defendant
will ultimately be required to establish his defense by a preponderance
of the evidence. The presumption is lost and if the holder does not
produce evidence that he is a holder in due course the maker will
be entitled to a directed verdict. If these decisions are correct, then
55. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE ISMTRuMENTs LAW § 59. See W. BanrrON, BILLS AND
NoTEs § 103 (2d ed. 1961).
56. UwoRm NEcOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52(4).
57. See cases cited in W. BmrroN, Bus AND NoTEs § 104 (2d ed. 1961).
58. See, e.g., Pitillo v. Demetry, 145 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. App. 1965); Korzenik v.
Supreme Radio, Inc., 347 Mass. 309, 197 N.E.2d 702 (1964); Unadflla Nat'l Bank v.
McQueer, 27 App. Div. 2d 778, 277 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1967); Pugatch v. David's
Jewelers, 53 Misc. 2d 327, 278 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1967); Peoples Bank of Aurora v.
Haar, 421 P.2d 817 (Okla. 1966); Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202
Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963); Westring v. Cheyenne Natl' Bank, 393 P.2d 119
(Wyo. 1964). Compare, however, Kinyon, Actions on Commercial Paper: Holder's
Procedural Advantages Under Article 3, 65 MicH. L. REv. 1441 (1967).
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this is a fundamental change in the burden of proof requirement.
Such decisions are unfortunate, for they constitute an erosion of
the rights of the holder in due course. There is some language in
the Comments supporting these decisions,5 9 and as regrettable as it
may be, apparently the intent here was to create a rebuttable pre-
sumption affecting only the burden of producing evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The treatment by the Uniform Commercial Code of presumptions
and burden of proof problems at many points presents a murky situ-
ation indeed. Much of the difficulty which may be expected will
result from interpretation of the Code sections dealing with presump-
tions and burden of proof. This problem could be alleviated by
amendments to the Code classifying the presumptions according to
whether they affect the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
non-persuasion, or the burden of proof in the sense of the burden of
producing evidence. In most instances, the underlying policy giving
rise to the presumptions in the first place provides a reasonable and
rational classification without too much difficulty. California's resolu-
tion of the problem seems eminently reasonable.
Difficulties presented by loose language in the Comments which
is likely to be confusing could be corrected without difficulty. Clarifi-
cation of the Comments is a task easy to perform, but convincing
the legislatures of forty-nine states which have enacted the Code that
they should make highly technical amendments necessary to clarify
the presumption problem would be a most difficult task. However,
in view of the change in substantive result which may obtain as a
result of lack of uniformity in construction and interpretation, it is
an effort which should be undertaken.
59. UNIFOPm COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-307, Comments 1 & 3.
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